University of Mississippi

eGrove
Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Graduate School

1-1-2022

Auditors Are Known by the Companies that Keep Them: The
Effect of Media Sensationalism and Audit Firm Responses on
Auditor Ratification
LATOYA FLINT

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/etd

Recommended Citation
FLINT, LATOYA, "Auditors Are Known by the Companies that Keep Them: The Effect of Media
Sensationalism and Audit Firm Responses on Auditor Ratification" (2022). Electronic Theses and
Dissertations. 2215.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/etd/2215

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at eGrove. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more
information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

AUDITORS ARE KNOWN BY THE COMPANIES THAT KEEP THEM:
THE EFFECT OF MEDIA SENSATIONALISM AND AUDIT FIRM RESPONSES ON
AUDITOR RATIFICATION

A Dissertation
Presented in partial fulfillment of requirements for
Doctor of Philosophy degree in the
Patterson School of Accountancy
The University of Mississippi

LaToya Louise Flint
May 2022

Copyright © 2022 by LaToya L. Flint
All rights reserved

ABSTRACT
This study examines media influence on auditor relationships with client shareholders.
Audit firms are concerned about client loss due to reputational damage. Sensationalized media
reports of corporate accounting frauds can be misleading in their description of the auditor’s
responsibility for fraud detection. Although audit firms do not control media sensationalism, they
can respond to it. I conduct an experiment to examine the impact of media sensationalism and
audit firm responses on shareholders’ likelihood to support auditor ratification. I predict and find
that high media sensationalism leads shareholders to perceive a higher level of audit firm control
over adverse fraud outcomes. In turn, this high perception of audit firm control decreases the
shareholders’ support for auditor ratification. I also find that firms who shift the blame to clients
are more effective at securing ratification than those who apologize or do not respond. The
results are informative to audit firm client retention strategies and research on auditorshareholder relationships.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

“As long as investors suffer losses from a sudden and drastic drop in earnings or the
bankruptcy of a corporation which was widely regarded as a good investment, our
profession is going to be criticized in the news media.”
Wallace E. Olson, former Executive Vice-President of the AICPA (Olson 1973, 9)

Audit firm reputation is impacted by sensationalized publicity of accounting scandals
(Van Peursem and Hauriasi 1999; Ege, Wang, and Xu 2021). Audit firms that are the subject of
this media coverage lose clients (Van Peursem and Hauriasi 1999; Ege et al. 2021). Big 4 audit
firms’ perceived complicity in a series of recent accounting crises presents a major reputational
risk due to the potential loss of their indirectly impacted clients (Coombs 2007; Kinder 2020). 1
Prior research finds that audit firms experience reputational benefits by issuing effective
responses after deficient audits (Cornell, Warne, and Eining 2009; Rasso 2014), but audit firm
responses to negative media coverage and shareholders’ behaviors surrounding these responses
have not yet been explored in academic research. My study addresses this void by examining the
impact of media sensationalism and audit firm responses on auditor ratification.

“Indirectly impacted” is used in this study to refer to the audit firm’s clients who are not directly involved in the
accounting fraud of interest. For example, Delta Airlines, FedEx, and International Paper were some of Arthur
Andersen’s “indirectly impacted” clients after the 2001 Enron scandal.
1
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Recent research on audit firm reputation suggests that “auditors are known by the
companies they keep” as it relates to client acceptance and continuance decisions (Cook,
Kowaleski, Minnis, Sutherland, and Zehms 2020, 4), but my current study argues that audit firm
reputation also depends on the clients that decide to keep the audit firm. “Accounting firms don’t
make the decision to quit their clients lightly”, therefore, it is important to examine clientinitiated auditor dismissals (Phillips 2022, para. 19). Client-initiated audit firm dismissals
account for 83% of audit firm switches between 2000-2013 and the reasons behind these
dismissals are largely ambiguous in 8-K disclosures (Burks and Susteric 2022).
In this study, I examine how (1) media sensationalism and (2) audit firm responses affect
auditor-shareholder relationships. Shareholders serve an important role in determining whether
auditors are dismissed by voting in the annual audit firm ratification process (Dao, Raghunandan,
and Rama 2012). A recent, high-profile illustration of the importance of shareholders is General
Electric’s 2020 decision to terminate its 110-year relationship with its audit firm, KPMG, after a
minority of shareholders began to vote against ratification in 2018 (Egan 2018; Minaya 2020).
Media are perhaps the “broadest and most widely disseminated of all potential
information intermediaries, reaching both sophisticated and unsophisticated investors, as well as
managers, regulators, and other market participants” (Bushee, Core, Guay, and Hamm 2010, 2).
The financial press serves as shareholders’ primary knowledge source about the audit profession
(Runhke and Schmidt 2014) and shareholders depend on news media to learn about corporate
reputation dimensions that are challenging to observe (Einwiller, Carroll, and Korn 2010). Media
sensationalism of the auditor’s responsibility for fraud detection may be particularly informative
in shaping shareholders’ reputational assessments of their audit firm because audit quality is
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difficult to evaluate (Causholli and Knechel 2012) and non-professional investors are largely
unaware of the auditing standards (Cohen, Ding, Lesage, and Stolowy 2017).
The business press is incentivized to use attention-grabbing sensationalism as “click-bait”
to attract readers and increase ad revenue (Ahern and Sosyura 2015; Cohen et al. 2017; Marwick
and Lewis 2017). In an accounting crisis, the press can choose to publish sensationalized
accounts to describe the auditor’s responsibility for fraud detection or it can take a more “justthe-facts”, objective approach. Sensationalism not only refers to the topics of media coverage,
but also, and importantly for my study, the way the news is packaged. High sensationalism
emphasizes elements of a story intended to elicit an emotional response (Molek-Kozakowska
2013) and takes on a “reality-journalism tone” due to the media trend towards “infotainment’’
(Cohen et al. 2017, 640). The audit expectation gap is “the divergence between the public’s and
the profession’s conceptions of auditor’s duties” (Cohen et al. 2017, 637). Highly sensationalized
media coverage of accounting fraud may exacerbate this gap by conveying unrealistically high
expectations of the audit firm’s responsibility to detect fraud. Highly sensationalized reports use
phrases such as, “failing in its most fundamental duty” (Milligan and Miller 2020, para. 8). Less
sensationalized news coverage omits emotionally arousing language. This style of media
coverage uses fact-based phrases such as, “the primary responsibility for prevention and
detection of fraud is with the management” (Kowsmann and Eaglesham 2020, para. 2).
Since audit firms who are the subject of negative publicity lose clients, the firms have
incentives to proactively respond to this news coverage by issuing formal statements (Cowle,
Rawson, and Rowe 2021; Ege et al. 2021). My study examines three commonly used audit firm
response strategies: issuing an apology, blame-shifting (playing the victim), or providing no
response. The comparison of apology to blame-shifting is appropriate because crisis
3

communication research has identified these responses as effective opposite response types
(Coombs 2015). Research on corporate apologies consistently finds that audiences react
positively towards apologetic parties (Hargie et al. 2010; Alicke and Zell 2009; Goei, Roberto,
Meyer, and Carlyle 2007). Prior audit research finds that safe apologies, (e.g., “we are sorry”),
are effective at reducing audiences’ need to blame or punish auditors (Cornell et al. 2009; Rasso
2014). Audit firms may also opt to blame their clients for the negative consequences of a fraud
instead of apologizing for their non-detection of the fraud. Research on blame-shifting finds that
it is difficult for audiences to conjure sympathy towards powerful corporations who blame other
parties (Rai and Diermeier 2015). Lastly, audit firms may opt to remain silent and not issue a
formal response to media coverage.
My study builds on prior research in four important ways. First, I investigate how media
sensationalism leads to differences in perceived audit firm control over the adverse fraud
outcomes caused by a deficient audit. Second, because extant literature finds that appropriate
audit firm responses affect public perception of audit firm behavior (Cornell et al. 2009; Eutsler,
Holderness, Robertson, and Curtis 2019; Rasso 2014), I explore the moderating effect of audit
firm response type on the relationship between media sensationalism and perceived audit firm
control. Third, I examine the effect of the relationship between audit firm response and perceived
audit firm control over the adverse outcomes. Finally, I investigate the impact of perceived audit
firm control on the likelihood that shareholders support auditor ratification.
I apply a 2 x 3 between-participants experimental design to test my hypotheses. 2
Participants are recruited from CloudResearch to serve as proxies for non-professional investors.

An experimental setting is appropriate to investigate the causal mechanisms underlying the effects of media
sensationalism and audit firm responses on shareholder behavior.

2

4

Media sensationalism is varied across two levels (high vs. low) and audit firm response is varied
across three levels (apology, blame-shifting, or no response). To capture audit firm reputation
rather than direct harm, participants assume the role of indirectly impacted shareholders whose
audit firm has been implicated in a failure to detect another client’s fraudulent activities. All
participants read a news article related to a financial accounting fraud involving their audit firm.
Participants in the high media sensationalism condition read a news article containing
emotionally loaded words to describe the audit firm’s responsibility for fraud detection.
Participants in the low media sensationalism condition read the same article, absent the
emotionally loaded words. Participants in the apology condition are presented with a sympathetic
apology from the audit firm, adapted from Cornell et al. (2009) and Rasso (2014), while
participants in the blame-shifting conditions read a response from the audit firm in which the
firm casts itself as a victim who was deceived by its client (adapted from Antonetti and Baghi
2019). Participants in the no response conditions read an article that does not contain an audit
firm response. The primary dependent variable is the shareholders’ support for auditor
ratification. I collect additional measures, including shareholders’ perceptions of audit firm
control over the adverse outcomes, audit firm reputation, affective reactions, and attribution of
blame to examine the processes by which the manipulated variables affect shareholders’ support
for auditor ratification.
I utilize the Culpable Control Model of blame attribution (henceforth, “CCM”; Alicke
2000) to inform my predictions about how differences in media sensationalism and audit firm
responses affect shareholders’ support for auditor ratification. The CCM defines “personal
control” as the ability to avoid harmful outcomes (Alicke 2000). For purposes of this study, I will
hereafter refer to the audit firm’s personal control over the adverse outcomes as “audit firm
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control”. I rely on the CCM to inform my prediction that shareholders exposed to high media
sensationalism will perceive greater audit firm control than shareholders exposed to low media
sensationalism because of its heightened reputational and emotional implications. I also predict
that the effect of media sensationalism on perceived audit firm control is moderated by the audit
firm’s response because each response type leads shareholders to experience varying emotional
reactions to their audit firm. Specifically, I predict that an apology decreases shareholders’
perceived audit firm control over the harmful outcomes more than blame-shifting or no response
because apologies increase firm likeability and decrease the desire to blame. Lastly, I expect that
shareholders who perceive higher levels of audit firm control are less likely to support auditor
ratification because of heightened blame attributions and a desire for punishment.
Consistent with my expectations, I find that shareholders exposed to the highly
sensationalized news article perceive greater audit firm control over the adverse outcomes of the
fraud than shareholders exposed to the less sensationalized article. The results also support my
prediction that shareholders’ assessments of audit firm control significantly predict their intent to
support auditor ratification. Specifically, I find that as shareholders perceive that the audit firm
had more control over the adverse outcomes, they become less likely to support auditor
ratification. Contrary to my predictions, I do not find support for the moderating effect of audit
firm response, such that an apology is more effective at diminishing perceived audit firm control
than blame-shifting or no response. In fact, my results indicate that shareholders perceive a lower
level of audit firm control and have a higher likelihood to ratify the auditor with blame-shifting
responses than with an apology or no response because they deem the firm less blameworthy.
My study contributes to both research and practice. First, it answers the call of Andon
and Free (2014) to “consider how the public face of accounting is mediated by the print media”
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(39) by providing critical insights into the mechanisms underlying shareholders’ behavioral
responses to media coverage of their audit firm. Second, this study addresses the dearth of
research related to factors that affect auditor-shareholder relationships. This research also
contributes to current audit literature by extending the CCM for usage in audit contexts outside
of legal settings. My study also contributes to extant literature in media effects, corporate
governance, organizational crisis communications, marketing, reputational management, and
public relations, particularly by addressing the paucity of research related to multi-brand crises.
The International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) is actively seeking
ways to address the audit expectation gap3, therefore, the results of this study are informative to
practice (IAASB 2020). Moreover, the results provide empirical evidence to audit firms seeking
effective ways to develop reputational capital and foster client retention. Lastly, my research is
useful to accounting practice because it highlights the media as important areas of negative
reputational influence and suggests response strategies that may ameliorate its effects.

The IAASB hosted a live streaming roundtable discussion on September 28, 2020, via YouTube with a panel of
governance experts, corporate directors, audit leaders, and leaders from the private sector to discuss ways to address
the expectation gap.

3
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CHAPTER II
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

Media Sensationalism of Accounting Frauds
Popular press has an important role in the dissemination of accounting information to the
public (Ahern and Sosyura 2015; Bushee et al. 2010; Joe, Louis, and Robinson 2009). The
financial press serves as an information intermediary which reduces the information asymmetry
between firms and investors (Bushee et al. 2010; Miller 2006). Media impact has been studied in
a variety of disciplines, but the study of media effects is limited in accounting research (Andon
and Free 2014). Much of the research in this space focuses on audit firm responses to media
coverage of its clients (Burke, R. Hoitash, U. Hoitash 2019; Cahan, Chen, and Wang 2020;
Gates, Reckers, and Robinson 2009; Gong, Gul, and Shan 2018; Joe 2003). Outside of a couple
of concurrent working papers, research is especially limited when it comes to understanding the
role that the media play in auditor-shareholder relationships.
A recent archival working paper finds that audit firms respond to negative media
coverage by charging higher fees and taking longer to issue the audit opinion (Cowle et al.
2021). Another concurrent working paper examines 41 Big 4 audit firm-related negative news
events from 2008 to 2017 and finds that the firms experience negative consequences because of
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this media coverage (Ege et al. 2021).4 Specifically, they find that Big 4 audit firms experience
client loss and fail to add new clients after negative news events (Ege et al. 2021). To my
knowledge, there is no research that specifically explores how media coverage of audit firms
affects shareholder behavior. My study addresses this gap by examining shareholders’ causal
attributions and behavioral intentions as an outcome of media consumption.
Highly sensationalized media coverage engages audiences emotionally, while low media
sensationalism engages audiences intellectually (Grabe, Zhou, and Barnett 2001). Grabe et al.
(2001) refer to this as “infotainment versus edutainment” (637). Highly sensationalized news
uses “emotionally charged words that, while relevant to a sentence’s affective tone, could be
removed without changing its substantive content” (Dahlstrom et al. 2012, 156). Prior research
finds that language used in financial disclosures affects investor decision-making (Hales, Kuang,
and Venkataraman 2011; Rennekamp 2012; Tan, Wang, and Zhou 2014) and emotionally
charged messages are especially influential, so there is reason to believe that highly
sensationalized news coverage influences shareholders’ decision-making (Kipp, Zhang, and
Tadesse 2019).
A survey of 462 prominent financial journalists finds that they gravitate towards covering
controversial subjects and companies (Call, Emett, Maksymov, and Sharp 2021). These
journalists reveal that the topic that they believe their readership is most interested in is corporate
fraud (Call et al. 2021). As such, corporate fraud is heavily covered by the financial press and
shapes public perception of the accounting profession (Andon and Free 2014; Runhke and
Schmidt 2014). As evidence of this impact, The Wall Street Journal won a Pulitzer Prize for its

My current study differs from Ege et al. 2021 because they exclusively focus on archival examination of 41 news
articles in which a Big 4 audit firm is the primary topic. My study focuses on examining the broader construct of
media sensationalism in news coverage in which the audit firm is not the primary topic of the article.
4
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coverage of accounting scandals (Joe et al. 2009). Research finds that in New Zealand, 30% of
articles containing mentions of audit firms, portrayed auditors as unethical and/or incompetent
(Van Peurem and Hauriase 1999). Further, Andon and Free (2014) find evidence of media
coverage and statement bias during an Australian National Rugby League fraud and its
subsequent audits. Media criticism of audit firm conduct even comes from the academic sector
(Lawrence, Low, and Sharma 2010).5
Although the business press is more likely to publish original reporting on alleged
accounting misdeeds than non-business press outlets (Miller 2006), both types of press outlets
use sensationalism (Cohen et al. 2017). Media sensationalism in coverage of accounting frauds is
described as the “preferences of news consumers for greater auditor responsibility to detect fraud
above and beyond the responsibilities stated in the auditing standards” (Cohen et al. 2017, 638).
The role of the business press as a “watchdog for accounting fraud” includes analyzing
and framing issues (Miller 2006, 1006). Media play an especially informative role in shaping
shareholders’ causal attributions for the consequences of fraud because unsophisticated investors
have difficulty understanding auditors’ responsibilities (Ruhnke and Schmidt 2014). Media
reporting informs public opinion and has the potential to exacerbate or mitigate the audit
expectation gap (Cohen et al. 2017). The audit expectation gap is “the expectation of the users of
financial information that audits provide an unrealistic level of assurance against fraud or
material error, especially when evaluated in hindsight after a material misstatement has been
revealed” (Knechel, Thomas, and Driskill 2020, 12). Auditing standards merely require that
auditors “plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial
statements are free of material misstatement, whether caused by error or fraud” (ISA 700 ¶11).
An example of criticism from the academy is commentary from Professor Prem Sikka, an accounting academic
who uses the media to give his, often blistering, reviews of audit firm conduct.

5
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“Reasonable assurance”, as defined by auditing standards, does not require absolute assurance,
so even a properly conducted audit might fail to identify a material misstatement due to fraud
(ISA 700 ¶37b).
The press faces “few constraints to using frames to influence and manipulate citizens’
opinions” (Druckman 2001, 1041). Therefore, the journalistic styles selected by news outlets do
not have to be fully accurate to be published (Druckman 2001; Ahern and Sosyura 2015). Cohen
et al. (2017) suggests that the “media have an opportunity to exploit this ignorance by
sensationalizing the coverage of corporate frauds, thereby increasing the public’s unreasonable
expectations of auditor responsibility for fraud detection and widening the expectation gap”
(642). Media sensationalism of audit firm responsibility for fraud detection can take on a wide
variety of styles. These styles exist on a continuum which can range from emotionally blaming
the audit firm for failing to meet unrealistic expectations (high sensationalism) to objectively
explaining the audit firm’s responsibility for fraud detection by referencing the auditing
standards (low sensationalism).
A review of the financial press’ reporting on the recent, highly publicized $2 billion fraud
at German electronic payments company, Wirecard, offers a window into both journalistic styles
of interest. The company was audited by Big 4 audit firm, Ernst & Young (EY). Bloomberg
Business invokes high sensationalism to describe EY’s responsibility for fraud detection at
Wirecard by reporting that EY “stands accused of failing in its most fundamental duty” (Miller
and Jennen 2020). The Wall Street Journal provides an example of low sensationalism by
including a quote from Carmine Di Sibio, EY’s Chairman and Chief Executive, in which he
objectively explains that “the primary responsibility for the prevention and detection of fraud is
with the management” (Kowsmann and Eaglesham 2020).

11

Culpable Control Model
I rely on the Culpable Control Model (“CCM”; Alicke 2000) to form predictions about
shareholders’ behavioral reactions to media sensationalism and audit firm responses. Although
the CCM has been widely used in auditing research around juror behavior (Backof 2015; Brasel,
Doxey, Grenier and Reffett 2016; Gimbar, Hansen, and Ozlanski 2016; Vinson, Robertson, and
Cockrell 2019), the model is not limited to usage only in legal contexts (Alicke 2000). The CCM
suggests that individuals utilize blame-validation processing when seeking explanations for
harmful events by reviewing evidence in a biased manner and “exaggerating the actor's volitional
or causal control, by lowering their evidential standards for blame, or by seeking information to
support their blame attribution” (Alicke 2000, 558).
According to the CCM, in an audit context, an audience is likely to attribute blame for
adverse outcomes to audit firms they perceive to have control over the outcomes (Backof 2015).
The audience’s perception of the audit firm’s control in avoiding an adverse outcome is
comprised of causation, intentions, and foresight (Alicke 2000). Causation relates to the
audience’s perception of the audit firm’s unique impact on the harmful outcomes of the fraud.
Intentionality refers to perceptions about the audit firm’s intentions to conduct a quality audit and
foreseeability relates to the perceived degree to which the audience believes that the auditors
should have foreseen the harmful outcomes of their actions (Alicke 2000). Accordingly, the
CCM suggests that the sufficiency of the audit firm’s behavior contributes to perceived control
the firm has over the outcomes (Alicke 2000; Backof 2015).
I argue that highly sensationalized media reporting of an accounting fraud will negatively
influence the audience’s perceptions about the audit firm’s causation, intentions, and foresight.
Individuals make spontaneous (automatic) causal inferences while reading, even if they are only
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presented with limited amounts of information (Hassin, Bargh, and Uleman 2002). The CCM
strongly relies on audiences’ spontaneous affective evaluations of the accused party in formation
of control and blame assessments (Alicke, Rose, and Bloom 2011). Auditing literature finds that
audiences’ affective reactions to auditors influence evaluations of audit firm behavior (Backof
2015; Kadous 2001). These affective reactions are responses to both evidential and extraevidential factors (Alicke 2000).
The CCM identifies reputation as an extra-evidential factor that elicits affective
evaluations (Alicke 2000). Audit firms are justifiably concerned about reputational threats
because of the consequences associated with diminished reputation. Audit firm reputation is
consistently reported as the most important client selection attribute over audit fees, industry
expertise, and personnel characteristics (Hermanson, Plunkett, and Turner 1994). Further,
reputational loss following audit failures leads to significant loss of clients and revenues for audit
firms (Skinner and Srinivasan 2012). Organizational reputation can be negatively affected by
crisis framing (Dean 2004; Mason 2014). The CCM suggests that audit firm reputation has
implications for shareholder affective reactions which, in turn, affects perceived audit firm
control (Alicke 2000). See Figure 1 for model of determinants of audit firm control.
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FIGURE 1
Predicted Model of Determinants of Audit Firm Control Based on the CCM

I posit that high media sensationalism leads shareholders to attribute greater control to the
audit firm than low media sensationalism because shareholders will have greater negative
evaluations of the audit firm due to the heightened negative emotional and reputational
implications. This intensified negative affective evaluation of the audit firm, in turn, will lead
shareholders to deem the audit firm as blameworthy.
Extant literature finds that individuals who violate professional norms are considered
more blameworthy (Alicke et al. 2011). Alicke et al. (2011) finds that participants who were told
that a physician violated hospital policy found the physician to be more blameworthy, even when
patients experienced positive health outcomes. Prior auditing research finds that jurors perceive
less causal influence by auditors when the auditors’ defense argues that accounting standards
were followed (Backof 2015; Gimbar et al. 2016; Kadous and Mercer 2012). Consistent with this
reasoning, because low media sensationalism of audit firm’s responsibility for fraud detection
14

non-emotionally clarifies the audit firm’s role per the auditing standards, I argue that
shareholders exposed to low media sensationalism will perceive that the auditors had less control
over the adverse outcomes of the fraud.
Based on the above reasoning, this leads to my first formal hypothesis:
H1: High (low) media sensationalism leads to greater (lesser) perceived audit firm
control over adverse fraud outcomes.
Audit Firm Responses to Media Coverage
Financial journalists often contact firms to obtain their responses to articles prior to their
release (Call et al. 2021). Audit firms may choose to respond to media coverage of a client fraud
scandal by issuing a public response. Crisis communication in audit firms has the potential to
impact the firms’ full set of clients due to reputational spillover. 6 The audit firm is not fully
responsible for its clients’ illegal acts and one audience of interest to the firm (its set of clients
and shareholders) is only indirectly affected by the fraud. Audit firm responses to sources of
oversight have been studied in the context of PCAOB inspection reports (Robertson, Stefaniak,
and Houston 2014) 7, but to my knowledge, there has not yet been any research examining the
effect of audit firm responses in the context of media sensationalism. Since media sensationalism
impacts the public’s perception of audit firms, it is important to examine interventions that may
lessen the impact of negative media influence. Therefore, I examine the relative effectiveness of
three common crisis communication strategies: apology, blame-shifting, and no response.

Saito & Takeda (2014) find evidence of reputational spillover for Big 4 audit firms and their affiliates while
examining the audit failure of ChuoAoyama, a Japanese affiliate of PricewaterhouseCoopers.
7
The authors experimentally examine corporate executives’ assessments of audit quality and likelihood to switch
auditors as a response to PCAOB report findings and audit firm responses included in the reports.
6
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Apology
Corporate apologies are effective reputation builders for companies facing crises (Benoit
1995; Coombs and Holladay 2008) and have become widely expected by the public in recent
years (Hargie, Stapleton, and Tourish 2010). Organizations employ apologies as a method to
accept responsibility and build reputational capital (Coombs 2007). Recently enacted apology
laws even encourage physicians to express sympathy for medical mistakes without constituting
an admission of liability (Hodge 2020). In the case of medical errors, physicians who offer
sympathetic apologies face fewer malpractice lawsuits (Hodge 2020).
Audit firms have incentives to apologize even in cases of low media sensationalism
because as Rasso (2014) finds, “the firm can theoretically benefit from offering an apology that
is not prompted by an accusation” (165). Recently, Carmine Di Sibio, EY Global Chairman,
“expressed regret that a fraud at collapsed German fintech Wirecard was not uncovered sooner
by his firm’s auditors” (Kinder 2020). Accounting research finds that safe apologies which offer
expressions of sympathy, but do not explicitly accept responsibility (e.g., “I am sorry”), are
effective for auditors (Cornell et al. 2009; Rasso 2014). Cornell et al. (2009) finds that jurors are
less likely to assign blame to apologetic auditors, which leads to fewer negligence verdicts.
Research also finds that audit firms’ apologies that contain multiple components (e.g., an
expression of sympathy, acceptance of responsibility, and a promise to refrain) decrease
reputational damage and reduce audiences’ need to punish (Rasso 2014). My current study aims
to contribute to the sparse research on audit firm apologies by specifically examining an apology
as a response technique in the wake of negative and potentially sensationalized media coverage.
Prior research finds that apologies reduce negative evaluations of the accused party
(Hargie et al. 2010). Furthermore, extant literature finds that apologies contribute to audiences’
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positive affective evaluations by increasing the likeability of the apologizer (Alicke and Zell
2009; Goei, Roberto, Meyer, and Carlyle 2007) and diminishing audiences’ negative emotions
towards the apologizer (Ohbuchi, Kameda, and Agarie 1989). Based on the CCM, audiences’
affective evaluations of an accused party can simply be “goodness-badness judgments” (Alicke
et al. 2011, 691) that are strongly influenced by their perceptions of the accused’s character and
social attractiveness (Alicke 2000; Alicke and Zell 2009). Therefore, I argue that apologetic
audit firms elicit positive affective reactions which, in turn, lead to diminished shareholder
perception of audit firm control over harmful outcomes.
Although research generally finds evidence that apologies generate positive responses
from audiences, some research suggests the opposite. For example, Ferrin, Kim, Cooper, and
Dirks (2007) find that an apology signals a lack of integrity in integrity-based violations and a
recent study by Eustler et al. (2020) finds that audit firm apologies to its clients prior to making
information requests are not effective at decreasing client ill will.
Blame-shifting
Blame-shifting responses (also known as scapegoating or blame-giving) transfer blame
and responsibility to other actors connected to a crisis and are often viewed as a manipulative
tactic by audiences (Antonetti and Baghi 2019; Coombs 2015). An example of corporate blameshifting gone awry is when stakeholders reacted negatively to Mattel, Inc. who blamed its toy
supplier when its toys were found to be contaminated with lead paint (Coombs 2015). 8
Due to the nature of an auditor-client relationship, there is an implicit breach of trust
involved in a client’s fraudulent behavior. A blame-shifting communication strategy used by

Mattel, Inc. faced public backlashed after they inaccurately blamed their Chinese supplier when it was found that
their recalled toys had a design flaw related to its magnets rather than supplier issues. The company issued an
apology to the Chinese government when the facts of the case were revealed (Carvalho, Muralidharan, and Bapuji
2015).

8
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audit firms during a client fraud takes on a tone of self-victimization or “playing the victim” in
which firms align themselves with others who are negatively affected by their client’s deception.
EY utilized blame-shifting in response to its involvement in the Wirecard scandal by stating that,
“there was a group of criminals that managed to deceive everyone -- including us at EY”
(Matussek 2021, para. 3). In June 2020, The Washington Post published an opinion column
which criticized the overall EY response as “an alarming exercise in blame-shifting” and
described the firm as being “quick to cast itself as a victim” (Bryant 2020, para. 2). Arthur
Anderson also utilized blame-shifting when the firm revealed that they were misled by Enron
(Frammolino and Leeds 2002).
Consumers have a propensity to “victim-blame” organizations that use blame-shifting
strategies in accordance with Lerner’s “just-world hypothesis” in which people perceive that the
world is fair, and individuals get what they deserve (Furnham 2003). This is consistent with
research that finds that companies can “elicit anger as villains, but not sympathy as victims” (Rai
and Diermeier 2015, 18). In my study, the CCM suggests that shareholders will have unfavorable
affective reactions to audit firms who utilize blame-shifting responses because of the
shareholders’ need to preserve justice. I argue that negative reactions to blame-shifting will
lower the evidential threshold necessary to attribute control to the audit firm because high
sensationalism creates a negative emotional lens through which the blame-shifting is interpreted.
Therefore, especially under high media sensationalism, a blame-shifting response serves to
exacerbate the shareholders’ negative affective responses.
Despite the preponderance of evidence suggesting that blame-shifting is a suboptimal
crisis response strategy, there are instances when it can be effective. Antonetti and Baghi (2019)
find that blame-shifting is more effective than an apology or no response when the company uses
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detailed information to describe the blame target and a credible independent party also identifies
the responsible party. Prior research also finds blame-shifting is a more effective strategy than an
apology for reducing a firm’s attribution of responsibility and controllability when another large
corporation is blamed for the adverse outcomes (Moisio, Capelli, and Sabadie 2021). Further, in
the setting of my current study, the CCM suggests that shareholders exposed to blame-shifting
responses may discount the audit firm’s control because there is another plausible offender, the
client, being heavily implicated in the scandal. The potential for diffusion of perceived
responsibility may be particularly effective in a dual brand crisis like an accounting fraud.
Affective reactions are important components of causal judgments that are susceptible to
pervasive biases (Alicke et al. 2011). Due to the negativity effect, consumers place more weight
on negative information than positive when forming evaluations of companies (Ahluwalia,
Burnkrant, and Unnava 2000). The CCM suggests that audiences with especially favorable
impressions of the audit firm due to its apology will deemphasize highly sensationalized media
coverage of a client’s accounting fraud. Based on the preceding discussion, I predict that an
apology elicits greater positive affective evaluations of the audit firm than the potentially
deleterious blame-shifting response or no response at all.
Therefore, I formulate the following formal hypotheses:
H2: An apology leads to less perceived audit firm control over adverse fraud outcomes
than blame-shifting or no response.
H3: With high (low) media sensationalism, shareholders perceive more (less) audit firm
control over adverse fraud outcomes when the audit firm uses a blame-shifting response
when compared with an apology or no response.
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Shareholder Ratification of Audit Firm
Audit firms experience client loss in the wake of negative publicity (Ege et al. 2021).
Shareholders may be leery of continuing the relationship with an audit firm who is involved in
negatively publicized frauds because of the potential for reputational spillover. EY lost several
high-profile clients, including Deutsche Telekom and Commerzbank, after the collapse of
Wirecard (Storbeck 2021). In the aftermath of Arthur Andersen’s failed audit of Enron, Barton
(2005) finds that firms who are highly visible in the capital markets are the first to defect from
the audit firm, presumably for purposes of reputational preservation. Concurrent working papers
find evidence that audit clients’ concerns about their reputations when their auditor is the subject
of negative publicity is justified. Specifically, clients experience lower earnings response
coefficients and have an increasing likelihood that they file late following negative news
coverage of their auditor (Cowle et al. 2021; Ege et al. 2021).
Shareholders play an important role in determining whether auditors are retained (Barua,
Raghunandan, and Rama 2017; Brown and Popova 2019; Tanyi and Roland 2017). The U.S.
Department of the Treasury’s Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession recommends that
all public companies have shareholder ratification of audit firm selection (Dao et al. 2012).
Although public companies are not currently required to offer their shareholders an opportunity
to ratify their audit firm, there have been recent calls for mandatory shareholder ratification
(Mayhew 2017). Despite not being legally required, in a sample of Russell 3000 companies from
2009-2012, Cunningham (2017) finds that over 90 percent of firms voluntarily include auditor
ratification on the ballot. There are meaningful consequences when even small amounts of
shareholders vote against auditor ratification. In one of the largest votes against audit firm
ratification in recent years, 35 percent of GE shareholders voted against ratification of KPMG
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which ultimately led to its dismissal after serving a 110-year tenure (Rapoport 2018; Minaya
2020).
The CCM suggests that shareholders’ negative affective evaluations of their audit firm
due to the negative publicity surrounding them will strengthen their blame attributions (Alicke
2000). Attributions of blame strongly correlate with subsequent judgments of appropriate
punishment or responses to the blameworthy behavior (Mantler, Schellenberg, and Page 2003).
In an auditing context, Kadous (2001) finds that jurors utilize affective reactions as a signal of
audit firm blameworthiness. Additionally, Backof (2015) finds that jurors’ perceptions of audit
firm control influence verdict decisions. This suggests that shareholders will have a desire to
punish the audit firm’s perceived blameworthiness by defecting from their auditor.
Moreover, I argue that media sensationalism serves as an audit quality indicator,
particularly for non-professional shareholders who depend on the media for information about
their audit firm. Consequently, I posit that high media sensationalism leads shareholders to view
the audit quality provided by their audit firm as lower than shareholders who are exposed to low
media sensationalism. Since as previously hypothesized, high media sensationalism leads to
higher perception of audit firm control over the unfavorable outcomes, this informs my final
formal hypothesis:
H4: Shareholders are less (more) likely to support auditor ratification when they perceive
higher (lower) audit firm control over adverse fraud outcomes.
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CHAPTER III
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND METHOD
Participants
Participants were recruited to complete the online experiment in Qualtrics via recruitment
platform, CloudResearch. CloudResearch, formerly TurkPrime, is the leading participantsourcing platform used for online research. CloudResearch has been used for participant
recruitment for studies published in several highly regarded academic journals, including the
Journal of Consumer Behaviour, the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, and the
European Journal of Marketing. Research finds that CloudResearch participants value their
scientific contributions and provide high-quality data comparable to community and student
samples (Litman, Moss, Rosenzweig, and Robinson 2021).
Consistent with prior literature using online participants (Chmielewski and Kucker 2020),
participants had to have an approval rate of greater than 90 percent. Additionally, participants
were required to have completed greater than 100, but less than 50,000 Human Intelligence
Tasks (HITs). After meeting preliminary requirements, participants answered a set of a priori
screening questions. They were required to indicate that they were English-speaking 9, located in
the United States, and had personal investment experience to ensure they are appropriate proxies
for interested, non-professional investors. A total of 319 participants met the preliminary
screening criteria and completed the online experiment. The average time participants spent in
As part of the selected CloudResearch panel options, participants were required to select that either English is their
first language or if it is not, that they learned it before the age of seven.

9
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the experiment was approximately nine minutes. Participants were paid $2.25 to participate in
the study. 10
The participants were primarily white (73 percent) males (56 percent) with an average
age of 41 years. Study participants had an average of 20 years of professional work experience
and 11 years of personal investment experience. See Table 1 for participant demographics. In a
survey of financial journalists, they reveal that their targeted audience of interest includes
informed non-professional investors (Call et al. 2021). Based upon the screening criteria and
participant demographics, my study’s participants are appropriate to complete the experimental
task as proxies for non-professional investors.

300 participants were paid $2.25 each for participation. 19 participants completed the experiment for $0.00 due to
an error with the participation code at the end of the survey.
10
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TABLE 1
Participant Demographics
Total Participants (n):
Average Age (years):
Average Years of Professional Experience:
Average Years of Investment Experience:

319
41.47
19.77
11.14

Gender
Female
Male
Non-binary / third gender
Prefer not to say
Total

%
42.95%
56.43%
0.31%
0.31%
100.00%

n
137
180
1
1
319

Ethnicity
Asian or Pacific Islander
Black or African American
Hispanic or Latino
Middle Eastern or North African
Multiracial or Biracial
Native American or Alaskan Native
Prefer not to disclose
White or Caucasian
Total

%
7.21%
9.72%
4.39%
0.94%
3.13%
0.63%
0.94%
73.04%
100.00%

n
23
31
14
3
10
2
3
233
319

Materials and Experimental Procedures
My hypotheses are tested utilizing a 2 x 3 full-factorial, between-participants
experimental design using online participants. 11 Media sensationalism is manipulated on two
levels (high vs. low) and audit firm response is manipulated on three levels (apology, blameshifting, or no response). Participants were randomly assigned to experimental conditions. My
experimental case is largely modified from Rasso (2014). See full experimental materials in
Appendix A. The experiment begins by instructing participants that they are to regard themselves

11

I received approval from the University’s Institutional Review Board prior to running the experiment.
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as shareholders of Oliver, Inc., a corporation that is audited by a large, international audit firm,
Abbott & Bailey. There are costs associated with switching audit firms, so to enhance external
validity, participants are informed that the management of Oliver, Inc. has expressed concerns
about potentially switching audit firms in the future because they have a strong working
relationship with Abbott & Bailey. Participants then receive background information about
Abbott & Bailey, including statements that the audit firm has never been involved in any
accounting scandals and has never received negative publicity.
Participants then answer questions to assess their initial spontaneous affective reactions
to the audit firm, including their perceptions of audit firm reputation and favorability. They also
answer a question to assess their initial beliefs about external auditors’ responsibility for fraud
detection. Next, participants are presented with a news article that describes a fictitious fraud
committed by LHF Enterprises, another client of Abbott & Bailey. The news article is presented
in the format of a media print article which is consistent with the format of media examined by
prior archival research on media coverage of audit firms (Cowle et al. 2021; Ege et al. 2021).
This news article contains my manipulations of the independent variables. The experiment
concludes with post-experimental and demographic questions. See Figure 2 for graphical
depiction of the experimental flow.
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FIGURE 2
Experimental Flow

Independent Variables
All participants receive the same instructions and general background information12
before the study’s two independent variables are manipulated in the fictitious news article. I
manipulate media sensationalism across two levels: high and low. Consistent with prior research
(Dahlstrom et al. 2012; Gorney 1992), I operationalize media sensationalism by manipulating the
presence of emotionally loaded words in the news article, as illustrated in Appendix A. In the
high media sensationalism condition, the body of the article contains emotionally loaded words.
The selected words all fall within the top 50% of the emotional arousal dimension in the
Warriner, Kuperman, and Brysbaert (2013) database of approximately 14,000 words. Examples
of emotionally loaded words used in my manipulation are “disastrous”, “negligent”, and
“horrendously failed”. In the low media sensationalism condition, the news article omits the
emotionally loaded words used in the high media sensationalism condition.

Since the severity of a negative news article influences subsequent behavior (Ege et al. 2021; Kadous 2001), I
chose to keep the news article’s description of the negative consequences of the fraud consistent across conditions to
control for potential outcome effects.
12
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The audit firm’s response, which is provided in the same news article, is manipulated
across three levels: apology, blame-shifting, or no response as illustrated in Appendix A.
Participants in the apology conditions are presented with a sympathetic apology by an audit firm
spokesperson. A sympathetic apology from an audit firm significantly reduces evaluators’
assessments of punishment (Cornell et al. 2009; Rasso 2014); therefore, I selected this apology
type to maximize the strength of the manipulation. Although the apology wording is adapted
from Rasso (2014), whose audit firm apology is included in a posting on the firm’s website, my
experiment includes the apology in the body and sub-header of the news article for enhanced
external generalizability.
In the blame-shifting condition, the news article includes an audit firm response partially
adapted from Antonetti and Baghi (2019), which reads, “we condemn the irresponsible behavior
of LHF who is entirely to blame for the losses experienced by everyone – including us.” Lastly,
in the no response condition the news article contains no response from the audit firm.13
Dependent Variables
The study’s primary dependent variable is the shareholders’ assessment of their support
for auditor ratification. Support for auditor ratification is measured as the participants' responses
to the post-experimental question, "As a stockholder of Oliver, Inc. who is also audited by
Abbott & Bailey, please drag the slider to reflect how likely would you be to vote against or for
ratifying Abbott & Bailey as the company’s auditors for the upcoming fiscal year? (0 = Vote
strongly against retention; 6 = Vote strongly for retention)”. Next, shareholders answer a series
of questions designed to capture process measures. These questions include the second measure

The “no response” simply does not include a response from the audit firm. There is no mention that the audit firm
did not provide a response.

13
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of the shareholders’ spontaneous affective reactions to the auditors and the second measure of
their beliefs about external auditors’ responsibility for fraud detection.
Consistent with prior research utilizing the CCM (e.g., Backof 2015; Gimbar et al. 2016),
I measure the shareholders’ views on perceived audit firm control, i.e., the extent to which the
audit firm’s behavior caused the fraud, the foreseeability of the fraud, and whether the audit firm
intended to conduct a quality audit. I create a composite variable to represent the shareholders’
perceptions of audit firm control. This variable is equal to the sum of the shareholders’
assessments of the audit firm’s causation (participants' responses to the post experimental
question, "To what extent do you believe that Abbott & Bailey’s (the audit firm) behavior caused
the negative consequences of the fraud (loss of jobs, money, retirement accounts, etc.)?") (0 =
Not at all the cause; 6 = Completely the cause), foreseeability (participants' responses to the post
experimental question, "In your opinion, to what degree do you believe that Abbott & Bailey (the
audit firm) foresaw the harmful outcomes of the LHF fraud?") (0 = No foresight at all; 6 = Full
foresight), and intentions to conduct a quality audit (participants' responses to the post
experimental question, "In your opinion, did Abbott & Bailey intend to conduct a quality
audit?") (0 = Did not intend at all; 6 = Fully intended). The participants’ assessments of the
auditor’s intentions to conduct a quality audit were reverse coded prior to creating the composite
variable for audit firm control. Higher mean values of audit firm control indicate that
shareholders attribute a higher level of audit firm control over the adverse outcomes of the fraud.
The Cronbach’s Alpha for the three-item audit firm control composite variable was α = 0.70
which indicates adequate internal consistency. Participants are also asked to indicate their
feelings towards both the audit firm and the client and the extent to which they believe each
party is to blame.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Manipulation Checks
Participants answered manipulation check questions at the end of the experiment to verify
that the media sensationalism and audit firm response manipulations had their intended effects. 14
Participants indicated the degree to which they believed the news article used sensationalism to
report on the audit firm’s responsibility to detect the fraud using a 7-point Likert scale from 0
(low sensationalism) to 6 (high sensationalism). Participants in the high sensationalism condition
indicated that the article employed sensationalism to a greater extent than those in the low
sensationalism condition (mean = 4.17 vs. 2.72, p < 0.01) suggesting my manipulation was
effective. See Table 2 for results of the sensationalism manipulation check.
TABLE 2
Sensationalism Manipulation Check Results

Perceived Sensationalism

HIGH
SENSATIONALISM
M
SD
4.17
1.36

LOW
SENSATIONALISM
M
SD
2.72
1.49

t-stat
9.08**

** Denotes statistical significance equivalent to p < 0.01.
Variable Definition:
Perceived Sensationalism = participants' responses to the post experimental question, "In your
opinion, to what extent did the news article use sensationalism to report on Abbott & Bailey
audit firm’s responsibility to detect the fraud?" (0 = Low Sensationalism; 6 = High
Sensationalism).
The manipulations were tested in an online pilot study in June 2021 with student participants to ensure the
adequacy of the research instrument prior to running the main study with different participants. See Appendix B for
pilot study demographics.
14
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To verify that the audit firm response manipulation was successful, participants were
asked if the audit firm spokesperson apologized for its deficient audit, blamed LHF Enterprises,
or neither. Approximately 84% of participants correctly answered the question, therefore, the
manipulation was successful. All 319 participants are included in the analysis because their
exclusion does not substantively change the results.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for variables of interest by experimental condition.
Additionally, Table 4 provides correlational information for selected variables.
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TABLE 3
Descriptive Statistics
Means of Variables of Interest (Std Error) by Experimental Condition

Support for Auditor
Ratification

HIGH SENSATIONALISM
No
Apology Blame Response
2.06
2.35
2.08
(0.23)
(0.24)
(0.23)
n=55
n=51
n=52

LOW SENSATIONALISM
No
Apology
Blame Response
2.65
3.26
2.46
(0.23)
(0.24)
(0.23)
n=54
n=51
n=56

Audit Firm Control

8.15
(0.49)
n=55

6.39
(0.51)
n=51

8.08
(0.51)
n=52

5.78
(0.50)
n=54

4.67
(0.51)
n=51

6.34
(0.49)
n=56

Causation

3.09
(0.21)
n=55

2.57
(0.22)
n=51

2.77
(0.22)
n=52

2.59
(0.21)
n=54

2.08
(0.22)
n=51

2.41
(0.21)
n=56

Foreseeability

2.53
(0.21)
n=55

1.84
(0.21)
n=51

2.56
(0.21)
n=52

1.83
(0.21)
n=54

1.55
(0.21)
n=51

2.27
(0.20)
n=56

Intentions

2.53
(0.21)
n=55

1.98
(0.23)
n=51

2.80
(0.22)
n=52

1.35
(0.22)
n=54

1.04
(0.23)
n=51

1.67
(0.22)
n=56

Reputation
(Measure #1)

5.02
(0.13)
n=55

5.31
(0.13)
n=51

5.14
(0.13)
n=52

5.00
(0.13)
n=54

5.24
(0.13)
n=51

5.16
(0.13)
n=56

Reputation
(Measure #2)

1.93
(0.20)
n=55

2.55
(0.20)
n=51

2.00
(0.20)
n=52

2.74
(0.20)
n=54

3.55
(0.20)
n=51

2.73
(0.20)
n=56

Auditor Blame

3.36
(0.20)
n=55

2.49
(0.21)
n=51

2.58
(0.20)
n=52

2.80
(0.20)
n=54

2.04
(0.21)
n=51

2.54
(0.20)
n=56
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TABLE 3 (continued)
Auditor Favorability
(Measure #1)

4.95
(0.14)
n=55

5.06
(0.15)
n=51

4.92
(0.15)
n=52

4.91
(0.14)
n=54

5.02
(0.15)
n=51

4.95
(0.14)
n=56

Auditor Favorability
(Measure #2)

1.71
(0.20)
n=55

2.57
(0.20)
n=51

1.85
(0.20)
n=52

2.67
(0.20)
n=54

3.55
(0.20)
n=51

2.57
(0.20)
n=56

Audit Quality

1.60
(0.20)
n=55

2.45
(0.21)
n=51

1.81
(0.21)
n=52

2.26
(0.20)
n=54

3.22
(0.21)
n=51

2.48
(0.20)
n=56

Expectations
(Measure #1)

5.22
(0.14)
n=55

5.22
(0.14)
n=51

5.08
(0.14)
n=52

5.07
(0.14)
n=54

4.9
(0.14)
n=51

4.95
(0.14)
n=56

Expectations
(Measure #2)

4.58
(0.19)
n=55

4.78
(0.19)
n=51

4.35
(0.19)
n=52

4.52
(0.19)
n=54

4.18
(0.19)
n=51

3.79
(0.18)
n=56

Variable Definitions:
Auditor Ratification = participants' responses to the post experimental question, "As a stockholder of
Oliver, Inc. who is also audited by Abbott & Bailey, please drag the slider to reflect how likely would you
be to vote against or for ratifying Abbott & Bailey as the company’s auditors for the upcoming fiscal
year? (0 = Vote Strongly AGAINST retention; 6 = Vote Strongly FOR retention).
Audit Firm Control = composite variable calculated as the sum of the participants' responses to the post
experimental questions related to causation, foreseeability and intentions (definitions below). A higher
score indicates a higher perceived level of audit firm control of the adverse outcomes of the fraud.
Causation = participants' responses to the post experimental question, "To what extent do you believe
that Abbott & Bailey’s (the audit firm) behavior caused the negative consequences of the fraud (loss of
jobs, money, retirement accounts, etc.)?" (0 = Not at all the case; 6 = Completely the cause).
Foreseeability = participants' responses to the post experimental question, "In your opinion, to what
degree do you believe that Abbott & Bailey (the audit firm) foresaw the harmful outcomes of the LHF
fraud?" (0 = No foresight at all; 6 = Full foresight).
Intentions = participants' responses to the post experimental question, "In your opinion, did Abbott &
Bailey intend to conduct a quality audit??" (0 = Did not intend at all; 6 = Fully intended).
Reputation = participants’ responses to the statement, “Please rate your perception of Abbott & Bailey's
reputation as an audit firm.” (0 = Extremely bad reputation; 6 = Extremely good reputation).
Auditor Blame = participants' responses to the post experimental question, "In your opinion, on a range
from NONE to ALL, how much blame does Abbott & Bailey deserve for the negative consequences of the
fraud (loss of jobs, money, retirement accounts, etc.)" (0 = None of the blame; 6 = All of the blame).
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TABLE 3 (continued)
Auditor Favorability = participants’ responses to the post-experimental question, “Given what you know
about Abbott & Bailey (the audit firm), do you have a favorable or unfavorable impression of the audit
firm?”. (0 = Very unfavorable; 6 = Very favorable).
Audit Quality = participants’ responses to the post-experimental question, “How would you rate the
quality of the audit work performed by Abbott & Bailey (the audit firm)?” (0 = Extremely Low Quality; 6
= Extremely High Quality).
Expectations = participants’ answers to the question, “In general, to what extent do you agree that
external auditors are responsible for detecting fraud present in the financial statements they audit” on a
Likert scale (0 = completely disagree; 6 = completely agree).

TABLE 4
Correlations Among Variables

Tests of Hypotheses
The Effect of Media Sensationalism and Audit Firm Response on Audit Firm Control (H1-H3)
I examine the effects of media sensationalism, audit firm response, and their interaction
on perceived audit firm control by utilizing a 2 X 3 analysis of variance (ANOVA) with audit
firm control as the dependent variable.
H1 predicts that shareholders exposed to high media sensationalism perceive higher audit
firm control over the outcomes of the fraud, compared with those exposed to low media
33

sensationalism. Consistent with prior audit research using the CCM (Gimbar et al. 2016), audit
firm control is calculated as the sum of participants’ responses to the post-experimental questions
capturing their assessments of audit firm causation, foreseeability, and intentions. 15 Higher mean
values of audit firm control indicate that shareholders attribute a higher level of audit firm
control over the adverse outcomes of the fraud.
As expected, I find that shareholders exposed to the highly sensationalized news article
perceived a higher level of audit firm control than those exposed to the lower sensationalized
news article (mean = 7.54 vs. 5.60, p < 0.01, one-tailed). Therefore, H1 is supported. Results are
reported in Table 5 and plotted in Figure 3.

Participants’ assessments of the auditor’s intentions to conduct a quality audit were reverse coded prior to creating
the composite variable for audit firm control.

15
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TABLE 5
The Effects of Media Sensationalism and Audit Firm Response on Audit Firm Control
Panel A: Assessment of Audit Firm Control by Condition (SE)[n]
MEDIA SENSATIONALISM
High
8.15
(0.49)
[55]

Low
5.78
(0.50)
[54]

Overall
6.96
(0.35)
[109]

Blame

6.39
(0.51)
[51]

4.67
(0.51)
[51]

5.53
(0.36)
[102]

No Response

8.08
(0.51)
[52]

6.34
(0.49)
[56]

7.21
(0.35)
[108]

Overall

7.54
(0.29)
[158]

5.60
(0.29)
[161]

Apology

AUDIT FIRM RESPONSE

Panel B: ANOVA Table
Source of Variation

SS

df

MS

F

p

Sensationalism (H1)

300.86

1

300.86

22.59

< 0.01*

Audit Firm Response (H2)

170.99

2

85.49

6.42

< 0.01*

7.26

2

3.63

0.27

0.38

4167.91

313

13.32

Sensationalism x Audit Firm Response (H3)
Error

*Significant at the 0.05 level. One-tailed p-value for directional predictions.
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TABLE 5 (CONTINUED)
Panel C: H2-Tukey Post Hoc Analysis (Firm Response)
Apology > Blame
Blame < No Response
Apology = No Response

Mean difference p-value
1.44
< 0.01*
-1.65
< 0.01*
-0.20
0.46

*Significant at the 0.05 level. The mean square (error) for the Tukey post hoc analysis = 13.32. One-tailed
p-values.
Variable Definitions:
Audit Firm Control = Composite variable calculated as the sum of the participants' responses to the post
experimental questions related to causation, foreseeability, and intentions (definitions below). A higher
score indicates a higher perceived level of audit firm control of the adverse outcomes of the fraud.
Causation = participants' responses to the post experimental question, "To what extent do you believe
that Abbott & Bailey’s (the audit firm) behavior caused the negative consequences of the fraud (loss of
jobs, money, retirement accounts, etc.)?" (0 = Not at all the case; 6 = Completely the cause).
Foreseeability = participants' responses to the post experimental question, "In your opinion, to what
degree do you believe that Abbott & Bailey (the audit firm) foresaw the harmful outcomes of the LHF
fraud?" (0 = No foresight at all; 6 = Full foresight).
Intentions = participants' responses to the post experimental question, "In your opinion, did Abbott &
Bailey intend to conduct a quality audit??" (0 = Did not intend at all; 6 = Fully intended). Reverse coded
for purposes of calculations.
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FIGURE 3

Perceived Audit Firm Control

The Effects of Media Sensationalism and Audit Firm Response on Audit Firm Control
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

8.15
8.08
6.39

6.34
5.78
4.67

AUDIT FIRM
RESPONSE
APOLOGY
BLAME
NONE
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H2 predicts that an audit firm apology leads to less perceived audit firm control than
blame-shifting or no response. Although there is a significant main effect for audit firm response
(p < 0.01, one-tailed), Tukey post hoc analysis (Table 5, Panel C) reveals that, contrary to my
expectations, shareholders who read news articles with an audit firm apology perceive a higher
level of audit firm control than those who read the audit firm’s blame-shifting response (mean =
6.96 vs. 5.53, p < 0.01). Furthermore, shareholders who read a blame-shifting response perceived
less audit firm control than those who did not receive an audit firm response (mean = 5.53 vs.
7.21, p < 0.01). Lastly, there are no differences between shareholders’ perception of audit firm
control between the no response condition and the apology condition (mean = 7.21 vs. 6.96, p =
0.46).
In H3, I predict that the effect of media sensationalism on perceived audit firm control is
moderated by audit firm response, such that, with high media sensationalism, shareholders will
perceive more auditor personal control when the audit firm uses a blame-shifting response when
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compared with an apology and no response. However, contrary to my expectation, I find that
there is no interaction between media sensationalism and audit firm response (p = 0.38).
Therefore, H3 is unsupported.
The Impact of Shareholders’ Perception of Audit Firm Control on Auditor Ratification (H4)
H4 predicts that shareholders are more likely to support auditor ratification when they
perceive lower audit firm control. Support for auditor ratification was measured as participants'
responses to the post experimental question, "As a stockholder of Oliver, Inc. who is also audited
by Abbott & Bailey, please drag the slider to reflect how likely would you be to vote against or
for ratifying Abbott & Bailey as the company’s auditors for the upcoming fiscal year? (0 = Vote
Strongly AGAINST retention; 6 = Vote Strongly FOR retention). I test H4 by conducting a
simple linear regression analysis of support for audit firm ratification on perceived audit firm
control. The overall regression is statistically significant (R2 = 0.12, F(1,317) = 42.70, p < 0.01).
Results indicate that perceived audit firm control significantly predicts shareholder support for
auditor ratification (β = -0.16, t = -6.53, p < 0.01). Therefore, H4 is supported by these results.
Supplemental Analyses
Test of Proposed Theoretical Model
I conduct a moderated mediation analysis to test my proposed theoretical model (see
Figure 2) using the Hayes (2017) SPSS PROCESS Macro version 4.0 (Model 7). I test the
interaction effect of audit firm response (moderator) on media sensationalism (independent
variable), perceived audit firm control (mediator), and support for auditor ratification (dependent
variable). This model examines whether the effect of media sensationalism on support for audit
firm ratification operates through a moderated relationship between audit firm response and audit
firm control. Results indicate that there is not a significant moderating effect of audit firm
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response on the relationship between media sensationalism and audit firm control in the model,
nor is there a significant direct effect of media sensationalism on support for auditor ratification.
However, the analysis indicates that perceived audit firm control does significantly affect support
for auditor ratification in the model (95 percent confidence interval of -0.19 to -0.09; p < 0.01).
This indicates that although media sensationalism and audit firm responses do not interact to
impact shareholders’ perceptions of audit firm control over adverse fraud outcomes, together,
they do indirectly impact shareholders’ support for auditor ratification through perceived audit
firm control. See Figure 4 for results of moderated mediation analysis.
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FIGURE 4
MODERATED MEDIATION ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF MEDIA
SENSATIONALISM AND AUDIT FIRM RESPONSES ON SHAREHOLDER SUPPORT
FOR AUDITOR RATIFICATION

Note: This figure depicts the predicted moderated-mediation relationship between variables. I used the SPSS
PROCESS Macro (Model 7) (Hayes 2017) to test the model. This model reports two-tailed p-values and 5,000
bootstrapped samples to estimate confidence intervals.
* Denotes statistical significance equivalent to p < 0.05.
Media Sensationalism is manipulated as high versus low. Participants exposed to high media sensationalism were
presented with a news article that contained emotionally loaded words. The news article for participants in the low
media sensationalism conditions excluded those words.
Audit Firm Response is manipulated as either an apology (adapted from Cornell et al. 2009 and Rasso 2014), a
blame-shifting response (adapted from Antonetti and Baghi 2019), or no response.
Audit Firm Control is equal to the sum of the shareholders’ assessments of the audit firm’s causation (participants'
responses to the post experimental question, "To what extent do you believe that Abbott & Bailey’s (the audit firm)
behavior caused the negative consequences of the fraud (loss of jobs, money, retirement accounts, etc.)?" (0 = Not at
all the case; 6 = Completely the cause), foreseeability (participants' responses to the post experimental question, "In
your opinion, to what degree do you believe that Abbott & Bailey (the audit firm) foresaw the harmful outcomes of
the LHF fraud?" (0 = No foresight at all; 6 = Full foresight), and intentions16 to conduct a quality audit (participants'
responses to the post experimental question, "In your opinion, did Abbott & Bailey intend to conduct a quality
audit??" (0 = Did not intend at all; 6 = Fully intended).
Support for Auditor Ratification is the participants' responses to the post-experimental question, "As a stockholder
of Oliver, Inc. who is also audited by Abbott & Bailey, please drag the slider to reflect how likely would you be to
vote against or for ratifying Abbott & Bailey as the company’s auditors for the upcoming fiscal year? (0 = Vote
strongly against retention; 6 = Vote strongly for retention).
Participants’ assessments of the auditor’s intentions to conduct a quality audit were reverse coded prior to creating
the composite variable for audit firm control.

16
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Reputational Implications
Reputation is considered an extra-evidential feature of the Culpable Control Model which
influences perceived blameworthiness (Alicke 2000). I collect measures of the participants’
perception of the audit firm’s reputation both before and after reading the news article to isolate
the effect of media influence on audit firm reputation. Reputational assessments were collected
on a 7-point Likert scale with higher values representing higher reputational assessments.
Reputation was measured as participants’ responses to the statement, “Please rate your
perception of Abbott & Bailey's reputation as an audit firm.” (0 = Extremely bad reputation; 6 =
Extremely good reputation). See Table 6 for descriptive statistics by experimental condition.
Additionally, a three-way mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) with a within-subjects factor of
Time (pre-article and post-article) and between-subjects factors of media sensationalism (high or
low) and audit firm response (apology, blame, or none) yielded a significant main effect of Time,
F(1, 313) = 816.45, p < 0.01. The overall mean difference between the pre-article and post-article
reputational assessments was -2.56 (mean 5.14 vs. 2.58) indicating that the informational content
in negative publicity adversely impacts auditor reputation. The ANOVA also yielded a
significant interaction between Time and Media Sensationalism, F(1, 313) = 23.67, p < 0.01.
Additionally, there is a significant interaction between Time and Audit Firm Response, F(2, 313) =
3.54, p = 0.03. See Figure 5 and Figure 6 for graphical depictions of the impact of media
sensationalism and audit firm responses on reputational assessments. Shareholder perception of
auditor reputation decreased after reading the article in all conditions.
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TABLE 6
Reputational Implications of Media Sensationalism and Audit Firm Responses

Means (Std Error) by Experimental Condition
HIGH SENSATIONALISM
No
Apology Blame Response

Reputation
(Measure #1)

Reputation
(Measure #2)

LOW SENSATIONALISM
No
Apology Blame Response

5.02
(0.13)
n=55

5.31
(0.13)
n=51

5.14
(0.13)
n=52

5.00
(0.13)
n=54

5.24
(0.13)
n=51

5.16
(0.13)
n=56

5.14
(0.05)
n=319

1.93
(0.20)
n=55

2.55
(0.20)
n=51

2.00
(0.20)
n=52

2.74
(0.20)
n=54

3.55
(0.20)
n=51

2.73
(0.20)
n=56

2.58
(0.08)
n=319

FIGURE 5
Reputational Assessments by Media Sensationalism Conditions
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FIGURE 6
Reputational Assessments by Audit Firm Response Conditions
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I also perform a simple linear regression analysis to test whether the shareholders’ final
assessment of auditor reputation significantly predicts their support for auditor ratification. The
overall regression is statistically significant (R2 = 0.51, F(1,317) = 328.43, p < 0.01). These results
not only suggest that the media play an important role in public perception of audit firm
reputation, but also that reputation impacts client retention.
Analysis of Blame
Since the Culpable Control Model is a theory of blame-attribution, it was important to
collect a direct measure of participants’ attributions of blame for the adverse fraud outcomes.
Blame was assessed for both the client and the audit firm and measured as participants’
responses to the post-experimental question, “In your opinion, on a range from NONE to ALL,
how much blame does each party deserve for the negative consequences of the fraud (loss of
jobs, money, retirement accounts, etc.)?” on a 7-point Likert-type scale where 0 = none of the
blame and 6 = all of the blame. Results of an untabulated ANOVA revealed that there were no
differences between perceived client blame by condition. Contrarily, media sensationalism and
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audit firm responses did have an impact on the assessments of perceived auditor
blameworthiness. See Table 7, Panel A for descriptive statistics by experimental condition.
Specifically, a factorial ANOVA revealed that there was a significant main of effect of both
media sensationalism (F(1,313)= 4.58, p = 0.03, two-tailed) and audit firm responses (F(2,313) =
8.35, p < 0.01, two-tailed) on shareholder assessments of audit firm blame for the adverse fraud
outcomes. There was not a statistically significant interaction between media sensationalism and
audit firm responses. See Table 7, Panel B for ANOVA results. Shareholders exposed to high
media sensationalism perceived that the audit firm deserved more blame for the negative
consequences of the fraud than those exposed to low sensationalism (mean 2.82 vs. 2.47). A
Tukey post hoc analysis was conducted on audit firm responses. Shareholders exposed to an
audit firm apology perceived that the auditor deserved more blame than those exposed to a
blame-shifting response or no response. This perceived blameworthiness for apologetic auditors
mirrors the results for shareholders’ assessments of audit firm control over the adverse outcomes.
This indicates that shareholders may view the auditor’s apology as an admission of guilt. See
Table 7, Panel C for comparison results.
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TABLE 7
Analysis of Auditor Blame
Panel A: Descriptives
HIGH SENSATIONALISM
No
Apology Blame
Response
Auditor
3.36
2.49
2.58
Blame
(0.20)
(0.21)
(0.20)
n=55
n=51
n=52

LOW SENSATIONALISM
No
Apology Blame Response
2.80
2.04
2.54
(0.20)
(0.21)
(0.20)
n=54
n=51
n=56

Panel B: ANOVA Table
Source of Variation
Media Sensationalism
Audit Firm Response
Media Sensationalism x Audit Firm Response
Error
Panel C: Tukey Post Hoc Analysis (Audit
Firm Response)
Apology > Blame
Apology > No Response
Blame = No Response

df
1
2
2
313

MS
9.93
18.11
2.06
2.17
Mean
difference
0.82
0.53
-0.29

F
p
4.58 0.03*
8.35 < 0.01*
0.95
0.39

p-value
< 0.01*
0.02*
0.33

*Significant at the 0.05 level.

Analysis of Favorability (Affective Reactions Towards the Audit Firm)
The Culpable Control Model largely relies upon audiences’ spontaneous affective
reactions in the formation of perceived blameworthiness. As such, I collect measures of the
participants’ perception of the audit firm’s favorability both before and after reading the news
article to isolate the effect of media influence on audit firm favorability. Favorability is
considered an evidential factor in the CCM and was assessed as participants’ responses to the
post-experimental question, “Given what you know about Abbott & Bailey (the audit firm), do
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you have a favorable or unfavorable impression of the audit firm?”. Favorability assessments
were collected on a 7-point Likert scale with higher values indicating more favorable reactions
towards the audit firm with a range from 0 (very unfavorable) to 6 (very favorable). See Table 8
for descriptive statistics. Additionally, a three-way mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) with a
within-subjects factor of Time (pre-article and post-article) and between-subjects factors of
media sensationalism (high or low) and audit firm response (apology, blame, or none) yielded a
significant main effect of Time, F(1, 313) = 725.81, p < 0.01. The overall mean difference between
the pre-article and post-article reputational assessments was -2.48 (mean 4.97 vs. 2.49) indicating
that the informational content in negative publicity adversely impacts perceptions of auditor
favorability. The ANOVA also yielded a significant interaction between Time and Media
Sensationalism, F(1, 313) = 24.17, p < 0.01. Additionally, there is a significant interaction between
Time and Audit Firm Response, F(2, 313) = 7.26, p < 0.01. See Figure 7 and Figure 8 for graphical
depictions of the impact of media sensationalism and audit firm responses on assessments of
auditor favorability.
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TABLE 8
Analysis of Favorability Towards the Audit Firm
Means (Std Error) by Experimental Condition
HIGH SENSATIONALISM
No
Apology Blame Response
4.95
5.06
4.92
(0.14)
(0.15)
(0.15)
n=55
n=51
n=52

Auditor
Favorability
(Measure #1)

1.71
(0.20)
n=55

Auditor
Favorability
(Measure #2)

2.57
(0.20)
n=51

LOW SENSATIONALISM
No
Apology Blame Response
4.91
5.02
4.95
(0.14)
(0.15)
(0.14)
n=54
n=51
n=56

1.85
(0.20)
n=52

2.67
(0.20)
n=54

3.55
(0.20)
n=51

2.57
(0.20)
n=56

FIGURE 7
Audit Firm Favorability Assessments by Media Sensationalism Conditions
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FIGURE 8
Audit Firm Favorability Assessments by Audit Firm Response Conditions

Audit FIrm Favorability

6
5
4

5.04
4.93
4.93

AUDIT FIRM
RESPONSE

3

3.06

APOLOGY

2

2.21
2.19

BLAME
NONE

1
0

1

2

Time

Audit Quality Implications
The financial press may serve as an audit quality indicator for investors. To test this
assertion, a measure of audit quality was collected as participants’ responses to the postexperimental question, “How would you rate the quality of the audit work performed by Abbott
& Bailey (the audit firm)?” on a 7-point Likert-type scale from 0 (Extremely Low Quality) to 6
(Extremely High Quality). See Table 9, Panel A for descriptive statistics by experimental
condition. A factorial ANOVA revealed that there was a significant main of effect of both media
sensationalism (F(1,313) = 17.65, p < 0.01, two-tailed) and audit firm responses (F(2,313) = 10.54, p
< 0.01, two-tailed) on shareholders’ perception of audit quality. There was not a statistically
significant interaction between media sensationalism and audit firm responses. See Table 9,
Panel B for ANOVA results. Figure 9 graphically represents this relationship. Shareholders
exposed to high media sensationalism perceived that the audit firm performed a lower quality
audit than those exposed to low sensationalism (mean 1.95 vs. 2.65). A Tukey post hoc analysis
was conducted on audit firm responses. Shareholders exposed to a blame-shifting response
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perceived that the audit firm performed a higher quality audit than those exposed to an apology
or no response. See Table 9, Panel C for comparison results. My findings are consistent with Ege
et al. 2020’s assertation that the business press influences investor perception of audit quality.
TABLE 9
Audit Quality Implications
Panel A: Means (Std Error) by Experimental Condition

Audit
Quality

HIGH SENSATIONALISM
No
Apology Blame Response
1.60
2.45
1.81
(0.20)
(0.21)
(0.21)
n=55
n=51
n=52

LOW SENSATIONALISM
No
Apology Blame
Response
2.26
3.22
2.48
(0.20)
(0.21)
(0.20)
n=54
n=51
n=56

Panel B: ANOVA Table
Source of Variation
Media Sensationalism
Audit Firm Response
Media Sensationalism x Audit Firm Response
Error
Panel C: Tukey Post Hoc Analysis (Firm Response)
Apology < Blame
Blame > No Response
Apology = No Response
*Significant at the 0.05 level.
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df

MS

1
2
2
313

38.97
23.27
0.085
2.21

Overall
2.29
(0.08)
n=319

two-tailed
p-value
17.65
< 0.01*
10.54
< 0.01*
0.04
0.96

Mean
difference
-0.91
0.68
0.23

F

p-value
< 0.01*
< 0.01*
0.49

FIGURE 9
Perceived Audit Quality by Experimental Condition
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Expectations Gap Implications
Media influence on the audit expectations gap is measured as participants’ answers to the
question, “In general, to what extent do you agree that external auditors are responsible for
detecting fraud present in the financial statements they audit” on a Likert scale (0 = completely
disagree; 6 = completely agree). This question was asked both before and after participants read
the news article. See Table 10 for descriptive statistics by experimental condition. Additionally, a
three-way mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) with a within-subjects factor of Time (prearticle and post-article) and between-subjects factors of media sensationalism (high or low) and
audit firm response (apology, blame, or none) yielded a significant main effect of Time, mean
(5.07 vs. 4.37), F(1, 313) = 83.21, p < 0.01. This result confirms Cohen et al. (2017)’s assertion that
the media’s unreasonable expectations perpetuate the audit expectations gap. There were no
significant differences in any of the remainder of the interactions.
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TABLE 10
Expectations Gap Implications
Means (Std Error) by Experimental Condition

Expectations
(Measure #1)

Expectations
(Measure #2)

HIGH SENSATIONALISM
No
Apology Blame Response
5.22
5.22
5.08
(0.14)
(0.14)
(0.14)
n=55
n=51
n=52
4.58
(0.19)
n=55

4.78
(0.19)
n=51

4.35
(0.19)
n=52

LOW SENSATIONALISM
No
Apology Blame Response
5.07
4.90
4.95
(0.14)
(0.14)
(0.14)
n=54
n=51
n=56
4.52
(0.19)
n=54
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4.18
(0.19)
n=51

3.79
(0.18)
n=56

Overall
5.07
(0.06)
n=319
4.36
(0.08)
n=319

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

In this study, I examine media influence on the auditor-client shareholder relationship.
Specifically, I explore the effectiveness of audit firm response strategies in mitigating the risk of
client loss in the wake of negative media coverage. I utilize the Culpable Control Model and
draw on research in crisis communication and public relations to examine the effect of media
sensationalism of the auditor’s responsibility for fraud detection and the audit firm’s response on
shareholders’ support for auditor ratification.
Consistent with my predictions, I find that high media sensationalism leads shareholders
to perceive higher audit firm control over the adverse outcomes caused by the fraud. Contrary to
expectations, I find that blame-shifting is more effective than an apology or providing no
response at reducing shareholders’ perception of their audit firm’s control over harmful
outcomes. This result may be attributable to shareholders’ perception that an apologetic firm is
more blameworthy. Lastly, I predict and find that shareholders’ perception of audit firm’s control
influences their decision to support auditor ratification.
My findings are important because audit firms are concerned about reputational risks
associated with negative media coverage. 17 The IAASB recognizes the importance of closing the
expectation gap and has a current initiative to understand stakeholder perspectives on the audit

As evidence of this concern, leaders from the Big 4 firms, BDO, and Grant Thornton in the UK all met in April
2020 to discuss potential further risks to their reputations after a series of corporate scandals have “bruised their
brands” (Kinder 2020). https://www.ft.com/content/65d8e851-5e33-4a2d-a814-a4c27f949dd3
17
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firm’s role in fraud detection (IAASB 2020). 18 This study is also important because of the strong
influence that the media have on influencing the audit expectation gap.
Cohen et al. (2017), 639 conclude that “unreasonable expectations” as a result of media
sensationalism is “nearly impossible for the auditor to manage”. Although auditors are not able
to control how the media decide to sensationalize their role in an accounting scandal, my study
demonstrates that it is within audit firms’ sphere of influence to decide whether to issue a
response that could potentially mitigate reputational damage. These results are informative to
audit firms’ crisis response and client retention strategies. The findings highlight the need for
audit firms to “control the narrative” in the media to combat the effects of a negative news cycle.
My study contributes to several streams of literature, including the audit expectations
gap, corporate governance, and research in reputation management. The results also contribute to
crisis communications literature by highlighting instances in which apologies are less effective at
reputation management than blame-shifting. Prior audit research on the media focuses on auditor
reactions to media coverage of its clients (e.g., Joe 2003). I extend this by examining shareholder
behavior in response to media coverage of their audit firm. My findings also contribute to the
sparse literature across all disciplines examining the impact of the media on customer behavioral
intentions in collective responsibility crises. Finally, this study extends research relying on the
Culpable Control Model by demonstrating the theory’s applicability in audit settings outside of
juror and legal studies.
This study is subject to certain limitations. The experiment may not be generalizable
because the participants are limited to a short, single-exposure news article about the accounting

IAASB Chair Tom Seidenstein states, “Issues related to fraud and going concern are consistently raised as areas
requiring attention and potential improvement in order to enhance confidence in audits. These two topics are
priorities in our recently issued strategy and work plan” (IAASB 2020).
18
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fraud before making their assessments. The study is also limited because it only explores three
audit firm crisis communication strategies: apology, blame-shifting, and no response. There is
the opportunity for future research to examine the effectiveness of additional audit firm
responses. In addition, future research could archivally examine stock price reactions to audit
firm responses. Lastly, future research could investigate associations between negative media
coverage of audit firms and client-initiated audit firm dismissals.
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APPENDIX A
EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS
Tuesday, March 22, 2021

NEWS TODAY

Issue #10

LHF Enterprises Slumps After Fictitious
Sales Disclosed
Audit Firm Response Sub-Header

TAMPA, FL – LHF Enterprises, a oncerespected major retailer in the United States, has
been charged with several counts of fraud related
to its 2019 consolidated financial statements. The
corporation has reported sales of over $500
million each year for the past ten years which,
along with several other strong financial
indicators, has led to a steady increase in the
retailer’s stock price.

“Pull Quote”

- Audit Firm Response

(Media Sensationalism Manipulation)
Many investors, creditors, and other stakeholders
rely on these opinions when making decisions.
No employee of Abbott & Bailey is believed to
have been involved in the perpetration of the
fraud committed by members of LHF
Enterprises’ management.

Allegations first surfaced last month that a sizable
percentage of the sales reported in 2019 are
fictitious. LHF’s stock price has plummeted over
the last several weeks since the initial fraud
allegations with many investors reporting the loss
of millions of dollars in their portfolio accounts.
Thousands of LHF employees have been laid off
and their pension accounts have been frozen.
Many of these employees have been forced to
watch their life savings and retirement accounts
wither away to nothing. LHF is expected to file for
bankruptcy within the next week which will make
it the largest U.S. corporation to file for
bankruptcy this year.

A spokesperson from the audit firm released the
following statement: “Abbott & Bailey has a long
history of performing high-quality audits. We
work hard to protect the integrity of our company
and the auditing profession…
(Audit Firm Response Manipulation)

Page 1
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MEDIA SENSATIONALISM MANIPULATIONS
HIGH SENSATIONALISM*

LOW SENSATIONALISM

Abbott & Bailey, a large international audit
firm, has served as the extremely neglectful
external auditor for troubled LHF Enterprises
since 1998. Incompetent Abbott & Bailey
horrendously failed to detect the disastrous
fraud present in the LHF Enterprises’ 2019
consolidated financial statements.

Abbott & Bailey, a large international audit
firm, has served as the external auditor for
LHF Enterprises since 1998. Abbott & Bailey
did not detect the fraud present in the LHF
Enterprises’ 2019 consolidated financial
statements.

The negligent audit firm embarrassingly
issued what is known as an “unqualified
opinion,” meaning that, in Abbott & Bailey’s
ridiculous opinion, LHF’s highly deceptive
2019 consolidated financial statements
conform with accounting rules and are
reasonably free of material misstatements.

The audit firm issued what is known as an
“unqualified opinion,” meaning that, in
Abbott & Bailey’s opinion, LHF’s 2019
consolidated financial statements conform
with accounting rules and are reasonably free
of material misstatements.

Although the International Standards on
Auditing place the responsibility for the
detection of fraud on a company’s
management, the auditors miserably failed in
their most fundamental duty of care.

Although the International Standards on
Auditing place the responsibility for the
detection of fraud on a company’s
management, the auditors have a duty of care.

*Bolded words in the article represent the emotionally loaded words present in the high
sensationalism condition but omitted from the low sensationalism condition.
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AUDIT FIRM RESPONSE MANIPULATIONS
APOLOGY

BLAME-SHIFTING

NONE

“We conducted an internal
investigation and uncovered a
deficiency that occurred during
the LHF Enterprises audit.

“We conducted an internal
investigation and discovered that
we were deceived during the
LHF Enterprises audit.

No audit firm
response is included.

We apologize for this deficiency
and are sorry to everyone that
experienced a loss due to the LHF
fraud.”

We condemn the irresponsible
behavior of LHF who is entirely
to blame for the losses
experienced by everyone –
including us.”

SUBHEADER

Auditor apologizes for deficient
audit of LHF Enterprises.

Auditor condemns LHF
Enterprises for irresponsible
behavior.

Audited by Abbott
& Bailey
Accounting Firm.

PULL QUOTE

“We apologize for this deficiency
and are sorry to everyone that
experienced a loss due to the LHF
fraud.”

“We condemn the irresponsible
behavior of LHF who is entirely
to blame for the losses
experienced by everyone –
including us.”

LHF Enterprises
charged with several
counts of fraud
related to its 2019
financial statements.

RESPONSE IN
ARTICLE
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Online Experiment by Screen
Instructions:
You will be presented with information regarding a fictional audit firm Abbott & Bailey. You
will be asked to provide your opinions based on a series of events involving this firm.
There are no right or wrong answers to the questions asked. The information provided in this set
of materials is not intended to be fully representative of the level of information which may be
available to you if you were asked to provide your opinions on similar topics.
While completing the case, please base your opinions only on the information provided. Please
read all information provided. Your responses will be kept confidential. No information about
your identity will be collected.
Thank you in advance for your participation!
LET'S BEGIN...
**NEXT SCREEN**
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General Background Information
Abbott & Bailey is a large, international audit firm founded in 1937. The firm serves as the
external auditor for many corporations both large and small. The firm also offers other
traditional services such as tax and consultation services. Abbott & Bailey has never been
involved in any accounting scandals and has never received any negative publicity.
For the purposes of this study, you are to assume that you are a stockholder of Oliver, Inc., a
large corporation that is audited by Abbott & Bailey.
Management at Oliver, Inc. has a strong working relationship with Abbott & Bailey, so they
have expressed their concerns about potentially switching to another audit firm in the future.
**NEXT SCREEN**
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Please answer the following questions:
(The following three questions are the first measure of the variables that are also collected after
reading the news article.)
1. Please rate your perception of Abbott & Bailey's reputation as an audit firm.
Extremely
Bad Reputation

[_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|____] Extremely
0
1
2
3
4
5
6 Good Reputation

2. Given what you know about Abbott & Bailey (the audit firm), do you have a favorable
or unfavorable impression of the audit firm?
Very
Unfavorable

[_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____] Very
0
1
2
3
4
5
6 Favorable

3. In general, to what extent do you agree that external auditors are responsible for
detecting fraud present in the financial statements they audit?
Completely
Disagree

[_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____] Completely
0
1
2
3
4
5
6 Agree
**NEXT SCREEN**
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Assume that you read the news article presented on the following screen about Abbott & Bailey
(audit firm) while scrolling through the business section of your favorite news website.
Please carefully read the article on the following screen as you will not be able to return to
the article after selecting the "Next" button.

**NEXT SCREEN**
Each participant was only presented with one of the following six news articles.
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HIGH SENSATIONALISM/APOLOGY
Tuesday, March 22, 2021

NEWS TODAY

Issue #10

LHF Enterprises Slumps After
Fictitious Sales Disclosed

Auditor apologizes for deficient audit of LHF Enterprises.
TAMPA, FL – LHF Enterprises, a once-respected
major retailer in the United States, has been charged
with several counts of fraud related to its 2019
consolidated financial statements. The corporation
has reported sales of over $500 million each year for
the past ten years which, along with several other
strong financial indicators, has led to a steady
increase in the retailer’s stock price.

“We apologize for this deficiency
and are sorry to everyone that
experienced a loss due to the
LHF fraud.”

Allegations first surfaced last month that a sizable
percentage of the sales reported in 2019 are
fictitious. LHF’s stock price has plummeted over
the last several weeks since the initial fraud
allegations with many investors reporting the loss of
millions of dollars in their portfolio accounts.
Thousands of LHF employees have been laid off
and their pension accounts have been frozen. Many
of these employees have been forced to watch their
life savings and retirement accounts wither away to
nothing. LHF is expected to file for bankruptcy
within the next week which will make it the largest
U.S. corporation to file for bankruptcy this year.

Although the International Standards on Auditing
place the responsibility for the detection of fraud on
a company’s management, the auditors miserably
failed in their most fundamental duty of care.

- Abbott & Bailey Spokesperson

Many investors, creditors, and other stakeholders
rely on these opinions when making decisions. No
employee of Abbott & Bailey is believed to have
been involved in the perpetration of the fraud
committed by members of LHF Enterprises’
management.
A spokesperson from the audit firm released the
following statement:

Abbott & Bailey, a large international audit firm, has
served as the extremely neglectful external auditor
for troubled LHF Enterprises since 1998.
Incompetent Abbott & Bailey horrendously failed to
detect the disastrous fraud present in the LHF
Enterprises’ 2019 consolidated financial statements.

“Abbott & Bailey has a long history of performing
high-quality audits. We work hard to protect the
integrity of our company and the auditing
profession. We conducted an internal investigation
and uncovered a deficiency that occurred during the
LHF Enterprises audit.

The negligent audit firm embarrassingly issued what
is known as an “unqualified opinion,” meaning that,
in Abbott & Bailey’s ridiculous opinion, LHF’s
highly deceptive 2019 consolidated financial
statements conform with accounting rules and are
reasonably free of material misstatements.

We apologize for this deficiency and are sorry to
everyone that experienced a loss due to the LHF
fraud.”
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HIGH SENSATIONALISM/BLAME-SHIFTING
Tuesday, March 22, 2021

NEWS TODAY

Issue #10

LHF Enterprises Slumps After
Fictitious Sales Disclosed

Auditor condemns LHF Enterprises for irresponsible behavior.

“We condemn the irresponsible
behavior of LHF who is entirely
to blame for the losses
experienced by everyone –
including us.”

TAMPA, FL – LHF Enterprises, a once-respected
major retailer in the United States, has been charged
with several counts of fraud related to its 2019
consolidated financial statements. The corporation
has reported sales of over $500 million each year for
the past ten years which, along with several other
strong financial indicators, has led to a steady
increase in the retailer’s stock price.

- Abbott & Bailey Spokesperson

Allegations first surfaced last month that a sizable
percentage of the sales reported in 2019 are
fictitious. LHF’s stock price has plummeted over
the last several weeks since the initial fraud
allegations with many investors reporting the loss of
millions of dollars in their portfolio accounts.
Thousands of LHF employees have been laid off
and their pension accounts have been frozen. Many
of these employees have been forced to watch their
life savings and retirement accounts wither away to
nothing. LHF is expected to file for bankruptcy
within the next week which will make it the largest
U.S. corporation to file for bankruptcy this year.

Although the International Standards on Auditing
place the responsibility for the detection of fraud on
a company’s management, the auditors miserably
failed in their most fundamental duty of care.
Many investors, creditors, and other stakeholders
rely on these opinions when making decisions. No
employee of Abbott & Bailey is believed to have
been involved in the perpetration of the fraud
committed by members of LHF Enterprises’
management.
A spokesperson from the audit firm released the
following statement:

Abbott & Bailey, a large international audit firm, has
served as the extremely neglectful external auditor
for troubled LHF Enterprises since 1998.
Incompetent Abbott & Bailey horrendously failed to
detect the disastrous fraud present in the LHF
Enterprises’ 2019 consolidated financial statements.

“Abbott & Bailey has a long history of performing
high-quality audits. We work hard to protect the
integrity of our company and the auditing
profession. We conducted an internal investigation
and discovered that we were deceived during the
LHF Enterprises audit.

The negligent audit firm embarrassingly issued what
is known as an “unqualified opinion,” meaning that,
in Abbott & Bailey’s ridiculous opinion, LHF’s
highly deceptive 2019 consolidated financial
statements conform with accounting rules and are
reasonably free of material misstatements.

We condemn the irresponsible behavior of LHF
who is entirely to blame for the losses experienced
by everyone – including us.”
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HIGH SENSATIONALISM/NO RESPONSE
Tuesday, March 22, 2021

NEWS TODAY

Issue #10

LHF Enterprises Slumps After
Fictitious Sales Disclosed
Audited by Abbott & Bailey Accounting Firm.

LHF Enterprises charged with
several counts of fraud related
to its 2019 financial statements.

TAMPA, FL – LHF Enterprises, a once-respected
major retailer in the United States, has been charged
with several counts of fraud related to its 2019
consolidated financial statements. The corporation has
reported sales of over $500 million each year for the
past ten years which, along with several other strong
financial indicators, has led to a steady increase in the
retailer’s stock price.

The negligent audit firm embarrassingly issued what is
known as an “unqualified opinion,” meaning that, in
Abbott & Bailey’s ridiculous opinion, LHF’s highly
deceptive 2019 consolidated financial statements
conform with accounting rules and are reasonably free
of material misstatements.

Allegations first surfaced last month that a sizable
percentage of the sales reported in 2019 are fictitious.
LHF’s stock price has plummeted over the last several
weeks since the initial fraud allegations with many
investors reporting the loss of millions of dollars in
their portfolio accounts. Thousands of LHF
employees have been laid off and their pension
accounts have been frozen. Many of these employees
have been forced to watch their life savings and
retirement accounts wither away to nothing. LHF is
expected to file for bankruptcy within the next week
which will make it the largest U.S. corporation to file
for bankruptcy this year.

Although the International Standards on Auditing
place the responsibility for the detection of fraud on a
company’s management, the auditors miserably failed
in their most fundamental duty of care.
Many investors, creditors, and other stakeholders rely
on these opinions when making decisions. No
employee of Abbott & Bailey is believed to have been
involved in the perpetration of the fraud committed by
members of LHF Enterprises’ management.

Abbott & Bailey, a large international audit firm, has
served as the extremely neglectful external auditor for
troubled LHF Enterprises since 1998. Incompetent
Abbott & Bailey horrendously failed to detect the
disastrous fraud present in the LHF Enterprises’ 2019
consolidated financial statements.
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LOW SENSATIONALISM/APOLOGY
Tuesday, March 22, 2021

NEWS TODAY

Issue #10

LHF Enterprises Slumps After
Fictitious Sales Disclosed

Auditor apologizes for deficient audit of LHF Enterprises.
TAMPA, FL – LHF Enterprises, a once-respected
major retailer in the United States, has been charged
with several counts of fraud related to its 2019
consolidated financial statements. The corporation
has reported sales of over $500 million each year for
the past ten years which, along with several other
strong financial indicators, has led to a steady
increase in the retailer’s stock price.

“We apologize for this deficiency
and are sorry to everyone that
experienced a loss due to the
LHF fraud.”

Allegations first surfaced last month that a sizable
percentage of the sales reported in 2019 are
fictitious. LHF’s stock price has plummeted over
the last several weeks since the initial fraud
allegations with many investors reporting the loss of
millions of dollars in their portfolio accounts.
Thousands of LHF employees have been laid off
and their pension accounts have been frozen. Many
of these employees have been forced to watch their
life savings and retirement accounts wither away to
nothing. LHF is expected to file for bankruptcy
within the next week which will make it the largest
U.S. corporation to file for bankruptcy this year.

Although the International Standards on Auditing
place the responsibility for the detection of fraud on
a company’s management, the auditors have a duty
of care.

- Abbott & Bailey Spokesperson

Many investors, creditors, and other stakeholders
rely on these opinions when making decisions. No
employee of Abbott & Bailey is believed to have
been involved in the perpetration of the fraud
committed by members of LHF Enterprises’
management.
A spokesperson from the audit firm released the
following statement:

Abbott & Bailey, a large international audit firm, has
served as the external auditor for LHF Enterprises
since 1998. Abbott & Bailey did not detect the fraud
present in the LHF Enterprises’ 2019 consolidated
financial statements.

“Abbott & Bailey has a long history of performing
high-quality audits. We work hard to protect the
integrity of our company and the auditing
profession. We conducted an internal investigation
and uncovered a deficiency that occurred during the
LHF Enterprises audit.

The audit firm issued what is known as an
“unqualified opinion,” meaning that, in Abbott &
Bailey’s opinion, LHF’s 2019 consolidated financial
statements conform with accounting rules and are
reasonably free of material misstatements.

We apologize for this deficiency and are sorry to
everyone that experienced a loss due to the LHF
fraud.”
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LOW SENSATIONALISM/BLAME-SHIFTING
Tuesday, March 22, 2021

NEWS TODAY

Issue #10

LHF Enterprises Slumps After
Fictitious Sales Disclosed

Auditor condemns LHF Enterprises for irresponsible behavior.

“We condemn the irresponsible
behavior of LHF who is entirely
to blame for the losses
experienced by everyone –
including us.”

TAMPA, FL – LHF Enterprises, a once-respected
major retailer in the United States, has been charged
with several counts of fraud related to its 2019
consolidated financial statements. The corporation
has reported sales of over $500 million each year for
the past ten years which, along with several other
strong financial indicators, has led to a steady
increase in the retailer’s stock price.

- Abbott & Bailey Spokesperson

Allegations first surfaced last month that a sizable
percentage of the sales reported in 2019 are
fictitious. LHF’s stock price has plummeted over
the last several weeks since the initial fraud
allegations with many investors reporting the loss of
millions of dollars in their portfolio accounts.
Thousands of LHF employees have been laid off
and their pension accounts have been frozen. Many
of these employees have been forced to watch their
life savings and retirement accounts wither away to
nothing. LHF is expected to file for bankruptcy
within the next week which will make it the largest
U.S. corporation to file for bankruptcy this year.

Although the International Standards on Auditing
place the responsibility for the detection of fraud on
a company’s management, the auditors have a duty
of care.
Many investors, creditors, and other stakeholders
rely on these opinions when making decisions. No
employee of Abbott & Bailey is believed to have
been involved in the perpetration of the fraud
committed by members of LHF Enterprises’
management.
A spokesperson from the audit firm released the
following statement:

Abbott & Bailey, a large international audit firm, has
served as the external auditor for LHF Enterprises
since 1998. Abbott & Bailey did not detect the fraud
present in the LHF Enterprises’ 2019 consolidated
financial statements.

“Abbott & Bailey has a long history of performing
high-quality audits. We work hard to protect the
integrity of our company and the auditing
profession. We conducted an internal investigation
and discovered that we were deceived during the
LHF Enterprises audit.

The audit firm issued what is known as an
“unqualified opinion,” meaning that, in Abbott &
Bailey’s opinion, LHF’s 2019 consolidated financial
statements conform with accounting rules and are
reasonably free of material misstatements.

We condemn the irresponsible behavior of LHF
who is entirely to blame for the losses experienced
by everyone – including us.”
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LOW SENSATIONALISM/NO RESPONSE
Tuesday, March 22, 2021

NEWS TODAY

Issue #10

LHF Enterprises Slumps After
Fictitious Sales Disclosed
Audited by Abbott & Bailey Accounting Firm.

LHF Enterprises charged with
several counts of fraud related
to its 2019 financial statements.

TAMPA, FL – LHF Enterprises, a once-respected
major retailer in the United States, has been charged
with several counts of fraud related to its 2019
consolidated financial statements. The corporation has
reported sales of over $500 million each year for the
past ten years which, along with several other strong
financial indicators, has led to a steady increase in the
retailer’s stock price.

The audit firm issued what is known as an
“unqualified opinion,” meaning that, in Abbott &
Bailey’s opinion, LHF’s 2019 consolidated financial
statements conform with accounting rules and are
reasonably free of material misstatements.

Allegations first surfaced last month that a sizable
percentage of the sales reported in 2019 are fictitious.
LHF’s stock price has plummeted over the last several
weeks since the initial fraud allegations with many
investors reporting the loss of millions of dollars in
their portfolio accounts.

Although the International Standards on Auditing
place the responsibility for the detection of fraud on a
company’s management, the auditors have a duty of
care.

Thousands of LHF employees have been laid off and
their pension accounts have been frozen. Many of
these employees have been forced to watch their life
savings and retirement accounts wither away to
nothing. LHF is expected to file for bankruptcy within
the next week which will make it the largest U.S.
corporation to file for bankruptcy this year.

Many investors, creditors, and other stakeholders rely
on these opinions when making decisions. No
employee of Abbott & Bailey is believed to have been
involved in the perpetration of the fraud committed by
members of LHF Enterprises’ management.

Abbott & Bailey, a large international audit firm, has
served as the external auditor for LHF Enterprises
since 1998. Abbott & Bailey did not detect the fraud
present in the LHF Enterprises’ 2019 consolidated
financial statements.
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Post-Experimental Questions
Free response (recall of messages): Please take two minutes to list anything that you recall
from the news article (including just words or short phrases). You do not have to complete each
box. (10 spaces)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
**NEXT SCREEN**
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As a stockholder of Oliver, Inc. who is also audited by Abbott & Bailey, please drag the slider
to reflect how likely would you be to vote against or for ratifying Abbott & Bailey as the
company’s auditors for the upcoming fiscal year?
Vote Strongly
AGAINST
retention

[_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____] Vote Strongly
0
1
2
3
4
5
6 FOR
retention
**NEXT SCREEN**
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(The following three questions are the second measure of the variables that were first collected
prior to reading the news article.)
1. Since you have now read the article, please rate your perception of Abbott & Bailey's
reputation as an audit firm.
Extremely
Bad Reputation

[_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____] Extremely
0
1
2
3
4
5
6 Good Reputation

2. Given what you know about Abbott & Bailey (the audit firm) now, do you have a
favorable or unfavorable impression of the audit firm?
Very
Unfavorable
3.

[_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____] Very
0
1
2
3
4
5
6 Favorable

In general, to what extent do you agree that external auditors are responsible for
detecting fraud present in the financial statements they audit?

Completely
Disagree

[_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____] Completely
0
1
2
3
4
5
6 Agree

4. To what extent do you believe that Abbott & Bailey’s (the audit firm) behavior caused
the negative consequences of the fraud (loss of jobs, money, retirement accounts, etc.)?
Not at all the
Cause

[_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____] Completely the
0
1
2
3
4
5
6 Cause

5. In your opinion, to what degree do you believe that Abbott & Bailey (the audit firm)
foresaw the harmful outcomes of the LHF fraud?
No foresight
At all

[_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____] Full foresight
0
1
2
3
4
5
6

6. In your opinion, did Abbott & Bailey intend to conduct a quality audit?
Did NOT intend [_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____] Fully
At all
0
1
2
3
4
5
6 Intended
7. How would you rate the quality of the audit work performed by Abbott & Bailey (the
audit firm)?
Extremely Low [_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____] Extremely High
Quality
0
1
2
3
4
5
6 Quality
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8. In your opinion, on a range from NONE to ALL, how much blame does each party
deserve for the negative consequences of the fraud (loss of jobs, money, retirement
accounts, etc.)?
Abbott & Bailey (the audit firm)
None of the
Blame

[_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____] All of the
0
1
2
3
4
5
6 Blame

LHF Enterprises (the company)
None of the
Blame

[_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____] All of the
0
1
2
3
4
5
6 Blame
**NEXT SCREEN**
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9. Please drag the slider to reflect what your feelings were towards each of the following
while reading the news article.
Feelings towards Abbott & Bailey (audit firm)
Very
Negative

[_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____] Very
0
1
2
3
4
5
6 Positive

Feelings towards LHF Enterprises (the company)
Very
Negative

[_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____] Very
0
1
2
3
4
5
6 Positive
**NEXT SCREEN**
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10. SENSATIONALISM MANIPULATION CHECK: In your opinion, to what extent did
the news article use sensationalism to report on Abbott & Bailey audit firm’s
responsibility to detect the fraud?
LOW
Sensationalism

[_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____] HIGH
0
1
2
3
4
5
6 Sensationalism

11. RESPONSE MANIPULATION CHECK: Which statement did the spokesperson for
Abbott & Bailey (the audit firm) provide in the news article?
a. Apologized for their deficient audit
b. Blame LHF Enterprises (the company) for the fraud
c. Neither
**NEXT SCREEN**
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Demographic Questions
1.

What is your gender identity?
A. Female
B. Male
C. Non-binary / third gender
E. Prefer not to say

2.

What is your age?

3.

How many years of professional work experience do you have?

4.

How many years of experience do you have of making personal investments in the stock market?

5.

Which of the following best describes you?
A. Asian or Pacific Islander
B. Black or African American
C. Hispanic or Latino
D. Middle Eastern or North African
E. Native American or Alaskan Native
F. White or Caucasian
G. Multiracial or Biracial
H. A race/ethnicity not listed here
I. Prefer not to disclose

6.

What is your highest education level?
Some High School

Some College

Completed High School (or Equivalent)

Graduated College

Completed Trade or Professional School

Some Graduate School
Completed Graduate School

7.

Are you now or have you ever been employed in the accounting profession? (Yes/No)

8.

Are you now or have you ever been employed in the law enforcement or legal profession?
(Yes/No)

9.

Do you speak English as the primary language at home? (Yes/No)
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APPENDIX B
Pilot Study Demographics
Total Participants (n):
Average Age (years):

61
22

Gender
Female
Male
Total

%
42.62%
57.38%
100.00%

n

Ethnicity
Black or African American
Hispanic or Latino
Multiracial or Biracial
Prefer not to disclose
White or Caucasian
Total

%

n

Ethnicity
Black or African American
Hispanic or Latino
Multiracial or Biracial
Prefer not to disclose
White or Caucasian
Total

%

n

Classification
Graduate Student
Junior
Senior
Total

%
57.38%
13.11%
29.51%
100.00%

n

3.28%
1.64%
1.64%
1.64%
91.80%
100.00%

3.28%
1.64%
1.64%
1.64%
91.80%
100.00%
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26
35
61

2
1
1
1
56
61

2
1
1
1
56
61

35
8
18
61

Pilot Study Demographics (continued)
Major
%
Accounting
91.80%
Finance
1.64%
Management
1.64%
Marketing
3.28%
Other
1.64%
Total
100.00%

n

56
1
1
2
1
61

Note: This study’s manipulations of media sensationalism and audit firm responses were tested
in an online pilot study in June 2021 with student participants to ensure the adequacy of the
research instrument prior to running the main study with different participants. The demographic
data above represent the background of the pilot study participants.
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